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The purpose of this paper is to develop an interpretive structural modeling (ISM) of barriers related to viability of Power Distribution Companies (discoms) in India.

Feedback from the Experts of Indian power sector has been taken as the basis to develop the model for barriers to viability of discoms, where major barriers have been identified through extent review of literature and through discussions with experts in the power sector keeping the viability of discoms in focus, and the hierarchical structure of barriers has been developed using ISM.

An interpretive structural model has been developed for discom-related factors (barriers) affecting its viability. The hierarchical structure portrays the impeding factors of viability and showcases that lack of regulatory effectiveness, inadequate tariffs and lack of government’s expenditures on power sector are the key barriers.

This paper has implications for both practitioners and academics. For practitioners, it provides an indicative list of major barriers affecting the viability of Indian discoms. For academics, the methodology used provides a mechanism to conduct an exploratory study by identifying the key variables of interest and emphasizing their interactions through hierarchical structures.

The proposed model for barriers to viability of discoms developed through qualitative modeling technique is a pioneering effort altogether in the context of power distribution companies in India. Understanding contextual relationships among key barriers to viability of discom’s is neglected in existing literature, and this paper makes a contribution in this regard.

This case describes the growth of ReNew Power during its first decade of operation. Sumant Sinha, a first-generation entrepreneur and former banker, founded the company, which grew from a modest generator-cum-developer of wind energy-based electricity to one of India's largest companies in the renewable energy sector. With the entry of large, well-funded players such as Tata Power and Adani Green into the Indian renewable sector by the end of 2020, Sinha had to make a strategic decision: should ReNew continue to organically scale up its presence in an increasingly competitive yet expanding Indian renewable energy sector, should it diversify geographically, or should it pursue emerging opportunities for vertical or horizontal integration within the sector? The case provides an opportunity to discuss how alternative business models and competitive scenarios may facilitate or inhibit the growth of a player in the renewable energy sector.

The case describes the structure of Infrastructure Investment Trusts (InvITs) created and launched in Indian markets in 2017. Besides introducing InvITs and their potential role in relaxing the financing constraint created by the lack of an active corporate debt market in India, the case can help in analysing why the market is discounting the IndiGrid unit price relative to its issue price. It also offers an opportunity to value IndiGrid's Patran acquisition.

This case is the first of a three-part series that follows the managerial, strategic, and communications decisions of the Swachh Bharat Mission (SBM) or Clean India Mission, the flagship programme of the Government of India to eliminate the practice of open defecation (i.e., not using a toilet) from 2014 to 2019. As of 2014, 550 million people in India practiced open defecation. This problem posed a massive public health hazard and economic drag for the country as well as a threat to global health. Written from an insider's perspective, the cases centre on the decisions made by a new Secretary of the India's Ministry of Drinking Water and Sanitation, who was hired to manage SBM, and the team he assembled. Case A sets the stage for addressing open defecation in rural India and discusses the human resources and strategic challenges to implementing SBM from the vantage point of the new Secretary. It ends with strategic dilemmas related to what the new SBM team should do once they had sized up the challenges to eliminating open defecation by 2019. The case provides an opportunity to deliberate the managerial and strategic decisions of a globally relevant public behaviour change and rural infrastructure development program as well as different forms of public sector implementation in the Indian context.

This case is the second of a three-part series that follows the managerial, strategic, and communications decisions of the Swachh Bharat Mission (SBM) or Clean India Mission, the flagship programme of the Government of India to eliminate the practice of open defecation (i.e., not using a toilet) from 2014 to 2019. As of 2014, 550 million people in India practiced open defecation. This problem posed a massive public health hazard and economic drag for the country as well as a threat to global health. Written from an insider's perspective, the cases centre on the decisions made by a new Secretary of India's Ministry of Drinking Water and Sanitation, who was hired to manage SBM, and the team he assembled. Case B discusses the start-up challenges for SBM, including implementation in India's complex federal system, workplace culture, and the deep-rooted behaviour of open defecation in rural India and the managerial and communication strategies formulated to address them. The case concludes by framing the difficulties with slow-moving states and monitoring rigour that the leadership SBM, with a new team, strategic focus, and early momentum, faced as the mission entered its final two years.

This case is a sequel to the “IndiGrid: Creating India's First Power Transmission InvIT (A)” case. It describes the deal that would replace the trust's original sponsor, Sterlite Power, with a new set of KKR-led financial investors. It provides an opportunity to discuss the consequences of this change on the new investment manager's outlook for management and future acquisitions. The new investment manager, freed from the limiting interest of the original sponsor, had to search for investment opportunities from the perspective of incoming financial investors, which included the new sponsor. It also provides an opportunity to evaluate the trade-offs in investing in operational utility-scale renewable energy assets by the IndiGrid, which had so far only acquired operational transmission assets in its portfolio.

This case is the second of a three-part series that follows the managerial, strategic, and communications decisions of the Swachh Bharat Mission (SBM) or Clean India Mission, the flagship programme of the Government of India to eliminate the practice of open defecation (i.e., not using a toilet) from 2014 to 2019. As of 2014, 550 million people in India practiced open defecation. This problem posed a massive public health hazard and economic drag for the country as well as a threat to global health. Written from an insider's perspective, the cases centre on the decisions made by a new Secretary of India's Ministry of Drinking Water and Sanitation, who was hired to manage SBM, and the team he assembled. Case B discusses the start-up challenges for SBM, including implementation in India's complex federal system, workplace culture, and the deep-rooted behaviour of open defecation in rural India and the managerial and communication strategies formulated to address them. The case concludes by framing the difficulties with slow-moving states and monitoring rigour that the leadership SBM, with a new team, strategic focus, and early momentum, faced as the mission entered its final two years.

The Indian electricity sector was opened to the private sector under the IPP policy. The NTPC, India's largest and perhaps most efficient generator had to respond to the changing scenario. It set out to set up the Simhadri project in Andhra Pradesh, going beyond to original mandate. The IPP policy, its perversities, the background of the power sector, the problems there in and the response of NTPC are discussed. Case (B) discusses the issues related to Project Planning and Implementation.

In October 2005, the representatives of the Planning Commission, Ministry of Railways, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and Ministry of Shipping met to discuss the RITES recommendations to work towards framing a policy document for running container trains by private and public sector operators on the IR network. Starting with this meeting until January 2006, various aspects of the RITES report were debated by the Planning Commission and Ministry of Railways to evolve a policy statement. There were concerns raised by the Planning Commission on the proposals by RITES which had implications such as entry barriers and denial of a level playing field with the incumbent, CONCOR. Other specific issues including entry criteria, entry fees and revenue share, and maintenance were questioned. In January 2006, a policy statement titled ‘Policy to permit various operators to move container trains on Indian Railways’ was released by the Ministry of Railways which stated the terms and conditions for running container trains by private and public sector operators on IR network. Subsequent to this, 14 parties signed up with the IR for container train operations. The empowered subcommittee of the Committee on Infrastructure was to meet in February 2006 to discuss the process for finalizing a Model Concession Agreement between Indian Railways and the container train operators. This case provides a background for this meeting.

Adani Power Limited (A) is the first case in a series of cases on the attempts by the firm to wriggle out of negative consequences of long-term fixed price power purchase agreements it had entered into. The firm wanted to terminate the agreement on the ground that its bid was based on coal allocation by another Government owned entity. This case describes as to how the firm was unable to get the contract terminated due to regulatory interventions. The case also raises public policy issues including the robustness of guidelines for procurement of power.